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Does the EU Directive on non-financial information influence the value relevance of 
ESG disclosure? Italian evidence
Abstract: The implementation of the EU Directive on non-financial information determines the transition from a 
voluntary to a mandatory disclosure setting. This paper is a first attempt to investigate if this transition influences 
the value relevance of non-financial information, which relates to the environmental, social and governance 
disclosure (ESG) requirements of the Directive. Italy provides an interesting setting as non-financial information 
was generally voluntary before the Directive, which was implemented with the Italian Legislative Decree 
254/2016. To this extent, we examine the non-financial, environmental and social disclosure practices of 231 
Italian listed firms in the pre- (2016) and post- (2017) Legislative Decree application. Our results do not show any 
relevant increase of such disclosures after the Decree application, as Italian listed firms limit such disclosure to a 
minimum requirement. Further, this finding is confirmed also for those firms voluntarily providing a non-financial 
report (sustainability or integrated report) before the Decree application. Our regression analysis shows that 
accounting numbers are associated with share prices, while non-financial, environmental and social information 
are not value-relevant with reference to the pre- and post-Legislative Decree application. This means that the non-
financial, environmental and social information beyond the financial accounting information do not explain any 
incremental value-relevant information to investors in the new non-financial mandatory disclosure setting required 
by the new regulation. Our results enrich previous evidence concerning the value relevance of non-financial and 
ESG disclosure mainly focused on Anglo-Saxon contexts.
Keywords: EU Directive; Non-financial information; ESG; Value relevance; Italy.
1. Introduction
The implementation of the EU Directive 95/2014 represents an important amendment, as it 
sets the transition from a voluntary to a mandatory disclosure setting of non-financial 
information. The Directive aims to encourage companies within Member States to 
communicate “quality, relevant, useful, consistent and more comparable non-financial 
(environmental, social and governance-related) information” (European Commission, 2017). 
More specifically, the Directive requires large firms to disclose information on the way they 
organize and manage social and environmental challenges. Firms have to publish reports on the 
policies they implement with reference to environmental, social an employee-related matters, 
respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. This may help stakeholders to 
evaluate the non-financial performance of companies and fosters firms to develop a responsible 
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approach to their business (European Union, 2014). Considering the overlap of the two concepts 
for the European Commission, we will use the terms non-financial disclosure referring to 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure. 
In the last years, non-financial information has been an issue of growing interest. In 
particular, non-financial disclosure has been the focus of some academics investigating if such 
information voluntarily disclosed by firms may be value relevant. Some studies show that 
voluntary environmental information (Hassel et al., 2005; Johnston et al., 2008; Sinkin et al., 
2008; Hussainey and Salama, 2010; Chapple et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 2013) and 
sustainability reporting (Schadewitz and Niskala, 2010; Berthelot et al., 2012; de Klerk and de 
Villiers, 2012; de Villiers and Marques, 2016; Reverte, 2016) is value relevant. On the contrary, 
other studies do not confirm the value relevance of non-financial information (Cormier and 
Magnan, 2007; Moneva and Cuellar, 2009; Carnevale et al., 2012). These mixed results are 
justified because of the differences on institutional settings, on the measurement of non-
financial disclosures or on the attitude of firms towards non-financial information, as some 
firms are not confident that this type of disclosures favorably affect their performance in 
financial markets. 
We believe that the introduction of mandatory requirements for non-financial disclosure in 
Europe gives the opportunity to analyze the transition from a voluntary to a mandatory 
disclosure setting with three main research purpos s. Firstly, if the empirical results of previous 
literature on the value relevance of voluntary non-financial information persist for firms who 
voluntarily disclosed non-financial information before the Directive. Further, if such firms find 
convenient to maintain their disclosure attitude after the Directive. Finally, what is the 
association between mandated non-financial information and share prices for firms that did not 
voluntarily provided non-financial information to the market before the Directive, but now they 
are forced to be compliant with its requirements. 
We address these purposes by focusing on the implementation of the Directive in Italy. In 
2017, the Directive was enforced into the Legislative Decree 254/2016 that closely recalls the 
contents included in the Directive without substantial changes (Legislative Decree, 2016). We 
analyse the value relevance of non-financial information of Italian listed firms, with a particular 
attention on environmental and social information, before (2016) and after the application of 
the Decree (2017). We believe that Italy provides an interesting setting as non-financial 
information in Italy was generally voluntary before the application of the Decree. Moreover, 
the institutional context in Italy is different from the traditional Anglo-Saxon setting. Indeed, 
previous studies mainly investigate the value relevance of non-financial information beyond 
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Anglo-Saxon settings (Lorraine et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Berthelot et al., 2012; de 
Klerk et al., 2015), while Italy is a Civil-law country, with a less developed financial market. 
Our results show that firms disclosing non-financial reports in both the pre- and post-
Legislative Decree application do not improve their non-financial as well as environmental and 
social disclosure, as they do not provide any relevant increase of such information. Firms 
disclosing information under a mandatory regime limit their disclosure to a minimum amount. 
This attitude is relative also to firms who voluntarily disclosed non-financial information before 
the Decree. These results support the lack of value relevance of non-financial, environmental 
and social information in the post-Legislative Decree application. The non-financial, 
environmental and social information does not explain any association with share prices. 
Our study has some contributions to literature. First, it expands previous literature focusing 
on the value relevance of voluntary non-financial information in a context of transition from a 
voluntary to a mandatory disclosure setting. Second, it enriches the studies on the value 
relevance of non-financial information in the Continental European countries (Moneva, 2009; 
Reverte, 2016; Verbeeten et al., 2016), which rely on a civil-law jurisdiction, funding of banks 
rather than shareholders, low disclosure requirements, as well as in Italy (Cardamone et al., 
2012). Third, based on the fact that non-financial information was voluntary before the Decree, 
our findings may be also of interest to regulators of financial markets, shareholders in their 
investment decisions and managers in their disclosure decisions for considering the impact of 
mandated non-financial information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the value relevance of 
voluntary non-financial information and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 provides the 
research method for the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 the 
conclusions.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
According to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) non-financial information is 
value relevant because it allows investors to reassess a firm’s expected cash flow and/or risk 
profile (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Accordingly, more accurate estimation of cash flows and risk 
can generate more value to investors, and thus, increase share prices (Wang and Li, 2016). A 
significant relationship between non-financial disclosure and share prices is predicted for 
positive as well as negative information. Positive information is expected to favorably affect 
firm performance, while negative information can prevent investors from overestimate the 
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effects of negative events (de Villiers and van Staden, 2011). By providing investors with the 
information they need to reassess future cash flow and risk, additional non-financial disclosure 
enables firms to reduce information asymmetry and avoid adverse selection, generally leading 
to positive economic outcomes (de Villiers and Marques, 2016).
Several studies use signalling theory (Akerlof, 1970) to explain the value relevance of non-
financial information. In this perspective, non-financial disclosure allows firms to signal to 
investors their better environmental, social and/or governance performance compared to 
competing firms (Mitchell, 2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). Hussainey and Salama (2010) 
state that higher corporate environmental reputation strengthen a firm’s reputation in the eyes 
of its stakeholders, thus it helps resolve investor uncertainty and influences the share price 
response (Ramchander et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, Verbeeten et al. (2016) use a socio-political framework to support the 
idea that voluntary sustainability disclosure could be irrelevant to investors, as it is salient only 
to stakeholders different from shareholders. However, their findings show a positive association 
between voluntary disclosure on social issues and share prices. Reverte (2016) maintains that 
even though voluntary corporate social responsibility disclosures “may be driven by 
stakeholders and/or societal pressures, such disclosures are likely to reduce information 
asymmetries and, thus, be rewarded by investors with higher stock market valuations” (p. 419).
Overall, many empirical evidence documents that both voluntary environmental disclosure 
(Hassel et al., 2005; Johnston et al., 2008; Sinkin et al., 2008; Hussainey and Salama, 2010; 
Chapple et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 2013) and sustainability reporting (Schadewitz and 
Niskala, 2010; Berthelot et al., 2012; de Klerk and de Villiers, 2012; de Villiers and Marques, 
2016; Reverte, 2016) are value relevant and contributes to improve market functioning. 
However, Lourenço et al. (2014) show that some differences exist according to institutional 
settings. They found that studies made in a predominantly North American context or a 
European context similar to the North American (such as the UK) document the value relevance 
of voluntary non-financial disclosure (Johnston et al., 2008; Sinkin et al., 2008; Hussainey and 
Salama, 2010; Chapple et al., 2011; Berthelot et al., 2012; Lourenço et al., 2012). On the 
contrary, studies conducted in the Continental European context show mixed results, with only 
a few studies finding that non-financial information is value relevant (Schadewitz and Niskala, 
2010; Reverte, 2016), whereas other studies do not corroborate such findings (Cormier and 
Magnan, 2007; Moneva and Cuellar, 2009; Carnevale et al., 2012).
In the European context, the EU Directive 95/2014 has started the transition from a voluntary 
to a mandatory disclosure setting of non-financial information. It forces the Member states of 
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the EU to issue regulation obliging some categories of firms to disclose non-financial 
information. To our knowledge, the effects of such a transition on the value relevance of non-
financial disclosure have not been investigated yet.
The introduction of mandatory requirements for non-financial disclosure is usually the result 
of a complex process, as self-regulation and government regulation often interact (Jackson et 
al., 2020). As in the case of the Directive, it has not been oriented to the definition of specific 
disclosure standards (Fox et al., 2002; Steurer, 2013), but it has hardened existing forms of 
disclosure (Moon et al., 2010; Gond and Nyberg, 2016) through the requirement of a minimum 
amount of information. Further, the Directive leaves firms with a high degree of discretion 
concerning the disclosure standards as well as the modalities of disclosure presentation. In Italy, 
the EU Directive was enforced into the Legislative Decree 254/2016, which closely recalls the 
contents included in the Directive without substantial modifications.
Overall, the application of non-financial mandatory requirements on non-financial matters 
is expected to increase the amount of information available on the market in the post-Legislative 
Decree application (Hassel et al., 2005). Focusing on specific environmental regulation, Dowell 
et al. (2000) found that U.S. firms adopting a single stringent global standard has much higher 
markets values compared to firms that apply less stringent standards. In the same vein, Maloney 
and McCormick (1982) show that environmental quality regulations of an industry make some 
or all of the firms in that industry more valuable. More recently, Hassel et al. (2005) document 
that the value relevance of environmental performance rating for Swedish companies is more 
pronounced after environmental accounting regulations was changed.
On the one hand, firms that did not voluntarily provided non-financial information to the 
market in the pre-Legislative Decree application will be forced to be compliant with the law. 
On the other hand, firms who voluntarily disclosed non-financial information may find 
convenient to maintain their disclosure attitude in the post-Legislative Decree application. In 
line with signaling theory, for showing a good performance to investors firms may be motivated 
to disclose even more than before the Legislative Decree application due to the higher average 
level of disclosure determined by the new regulation (Verrecchia, 2001). In this case, the higher 
level of disclosure may be value relevant.
Firms that voluntarily disclosed for gaining legitimation in the pre-Legislative Decree 
application may shift to pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), therefore relying on the 
minimal mandatory requirements to respect their social contract. This could reduce the costs of 
disclosure and contribute increasing the level of value relevant non-financial information 
available on the market. 
Page 5 of 23
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bse































































A main argument in support of the value relevance of mandatory non-financial disclosure is 
that mandatory disclosure increases the comparability of reports among firms as well as over 
time (Hess, 2007; Hess and Dunfee, 2007). Indeed, voluntary reports are of limited use for the 
lack of standardisation (Hess and Dunfee, 2007), which impedes comparability. To this extent, 
both the EU Directive and the Italian Legislative Decree apply the principle of comparability, 
as they require firms providing comparable information across years. 
Based on the above considerations, we state our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: The level of non-financial disclosure is associated with the firm's stock price in the 
post-Legislative Decree application.
Non-financial disclosure is multidimensional, as it includes broad subject-areas covering 
several and differing issues. The EU Directive and the Italian Legislative Decree require firms 
to disclose information on environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human 
rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. All these different types of information may have a 
different meaning in terms of value rel vance (Flammer, 2015; Verbeeten et al., 2016). For 
instance, environmental disclosure may discuss assets as well as liabilities, while social 
disclosure is more likely to be considered as intangible assets that provide information on 
human capital (Bird et al., 2007; Surroca et al., 2010). Verbeeten et al. (2016), investigating 
CSR disclosure in Germany, find that social disclosure is positively associated with firm value, 
but they failed to document any significant effect relative to environmental disclosure. Bird et 
al. (2007) show that higher environmental ratings are negatively associated with share price 
returns, while higher diversity and employee ratings are positively associated with share price 
returns. Kinderman (2008) suggests that “greenwashing” is less likely to affects social 
disclosures. 
Therefore, the disclosure on different non-financial subject-areas is expected to affect the 
stock value of a firm differently. Accordingly, we state our second hypothesis as follows:
H2a: The level of environmental disclosure is associated with the firm's stock price in the 
post-Legislative Decree application.
H2b: The level of social disclosure is associated with the firm's stock price in the post-
Legislative Decree application.
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3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample
Our sample is composed by Italian firms listed on Borsa Italiana at 31 December 2016 (363) 
and 31 December 2017 (381). According to the Legislative Decree 254/2016, firms prepare the 
consolidated non-financial statement (CNFS) when (i) they are public-interest entities (Article 
2, paragraph 2), (ii) they are required to prepare the consolidated financial statements (Article 
1, point c) point d)), (iii) they are large groups (article 1, point b)), and (iv) if they are included 
in the CNFS of a firm under the requirements of the Legislative Decree or in the CNFS of an 
European firm preparing its CNFS according to the Directive 2014/95/EU (Article 1, point e)). 
Firms without these prerequisites are excluded (81). Financial, insurance, asset management 
firms (77) and football clubs (3) are excluded because of the characteristics associated with 
their financial reports, as well as firms listed on AIM Italia preparing their financial statements 
under Italian GAAP (88). Firms in process of delisting in 2017 are also excluded (15). The final 
sample comprises 114 and 117 firms, respectively in 2016 and 2017.
The CNFSs are collected from the firms’ websites with a year-end in 2016 and 2017. Stock 
prices and accounting data are extracted from Datastream.
3.2. Collection and measurement of non-financial disclosure 
The content analysis consists of two phases: the identification of categories for developing 
an analytical framework for non-financial disclosure analysis based on CNFSs; and the 
measurement of the level of non-financial disclosure.
The Legislative Decree requires a CNFS containing information on the group’s 
development, performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a minimum, 
environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and 
bribery matters (Article 4, paragraph 1). Further, in providing this information, firms may use 
national standards, Union-based standards such as the EMAS, or international standards such 
as the UN Global Compact, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
implementing the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework, the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, the ISO 26000, the International Labour Organisation’s Tripartite 
Declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy, the Global 
Reporting Initiative (Article 1, paragraph 1, point f); Recital (9), Directive 2014/95/EU). Firms 
may adopt also other recognized international standards, such as the Integrated Reporting 
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Framework 1.0 of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) (Article 1, paragraph 
1, point f)). 
There are several reporting options for preparing the CNFS. It could be a) a section of the 
Management report or a stand-alone report b) in the form of a statement containing information 
under the requirements of the Legislative Decree, c) a sustainability report or d) an integrated 
report. If firms choose option b), the CNFS is a supplementary report to the Management report 
or the Annual report. If firms select options c) or d), they have to declare the report is equal to 
the CNFS relative to the Legislative Decree.
We develop an analytical framework that allows the classification of non-financial 
information into 3 levels of categories (Table 1). The first level contains 7 categories where 
firms disclose information according to the Legislative Decree on business model, economic 
and market performance, anti-corruption and bribery matters, environment, employee matters, 
protection of human rights, and social matters. The second level includes the categories relative 
to first-level where firms provide information by applying the G4 Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines. Indeed, the analysis of CNFSs indicates that all sampled firms use G4 for preparing 
their CNFS, which has allowed a consistent data collection. This means that the reporting 
format chosen for the CNFS does not influence the use of G4 as international standards. We 
have identified the type of second-level categories by grouping the G4 into uniform subject-
areas. They result in 46 second-level-categories. The third level comprises the G4 relative to 
each second-level category. The total amount of third-level categories is 264. 
To avoid reliability problems, 3 researchers have identified the list of third-level categories 
on 3 CFNSs. After discussing each individual coding, a final list of third-level categories is 
prepared by the authors.
We measure the level of non-financial information by considering the presence/absence of 
a disclosure item. This approach in a dichotomous method differentiates between those firms 
that disclose an item and those that makes none. In the previous literature, this approach has 
been seen misleading as “it treats firms making one sentence of disclosure as being equal to one 
makes fifty” (Hackston and Milne, 1996, p. 89). We apply this approach, as the purpose of our 
study is to investigate the non-financial disclosure practices after the implementation in Italy of 
the Directive 2014/95/EU. Our interest is not the focus on the detailed information about the 
subject of each category at the 3 different levels.
The non-financial disclosure index (NFDI) is calculated by counting the number 
(percentage) of third-level categories disclosed by an individual firm to the total number of 
third-level categories as follows:
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NFDIit =  
N
∑




dj = 1 if firm i discloses the third-level category j at the end of year t, 0 otherwise,
N = 264, the total amount of third-level categories.
The NFDIit is equal to 0, if firm i does not disclose any non-financial information in the 
CNFS at the end of year t, while it is equal to 1 if a firm i discloses all the third-level categories 
j. 
For the purpose of the analysis, we calculate the environmental and social disclosure indexes 
for measuring the level of information with reference to the first-level categories including this 
type of non-financial information. The environmental disclosure index (EDI) is calculated by 
counting the number (percentage) of third-level categories disclosed by an individual firm 
relative to the first-level category 4. Environmental information to the total number of third-
level categories; while the social disclosure index (SDI) is computed by considering the two 
first-level categories 5. Employee information and 7. Social information. The indexes are as 
follows:
EDIit =  
L
∑
h =  1
dh
L
SDIit =  
G
∑




h = number of third-level categories disclosed in the CNFS of firm i relative to the first-level 
category 4. Environmental information at the end of year t,
k = number of third-level categories disclosed in the CNFS of firm i relative to the first-level 
categories 5. Employee information and 7. Social information at the end of year t,
L = 70, the number of third-level categories relative to the first-level category 4. Environmental 
information at the end of year t,
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G = 69, the number of third-level categories relative to the first-level categories 5. Employee 
information and 7. Social information at the end of year t.
The two samples t-test and the Mann-Whitney test are applied to the means and medians of 
NFDI, EDI, and SDI to test the significance of differences on non-financial disclosures a) in 
the pre- and post-Legislative Decree application, b) when firms prepare a non-financial report 
in both pre- and post-Legislative Decree application, and c) firms preparing a non-financial 
report in both pre- and post-Legislative Decree application versus those preparing CNFS in the 
post-Legislative Decree application. Both statistical parametric and non-parametric tests are 
based on a null hypothesis assuming that changes in differences are equal in means (medians) 
versus the alternative hypothesis assuming that changes are not equal in means (medians).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
3.3. Valuation model 
In line with the market-based accounting research (Hassel et al., 2005; Berthelot et al., 2012; 
Cardamone et al., 2012; de Klerk and de Villiers, 2012; de Klerk et al., 2015; de Villiers and 
Marques, 2016; Qui et al., 2016; Reverte, 2016; Verbeeten et al., 2016), we perform a 
multivariate analysis by using the Ohlson model (1995). In this study, we use a share price 
specification of the Ohlson model that relates stock price to book value of equity and earnings 
to evaluate the value relevance of accounting information. This deflated specification of Ohlson 
model mitigates the “scale effect” due to the potential inferences based on size differences 
(Easton and Sommers, 2003; Barth and Clinch, 2009). 
To test hypothesis 1, we specify the following model:
Pit = α0 + α1 D + α2 BVPSit + α3 D x BVPSit + α4 EPSit + α5 D x EPSit + α6 NFDIit 
        + α7 NFDIit x BVPSit + α8 NFDIit x EPSit + α9 D x NFDIit + εit (1)
where:
Pit = stock price of firm i, 3 months after the end of year t,
D = dummy equal to Dt or Dnfr,
Dt = 1 if post-Legislative Decree application, 0 if pre-Legislative Decree application,
Dnfr = 1 if firms prepare a non-financial report (sustainability report or integrated report) in both 
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pre- and post-Legislative Decree application, 0 if not,
BVPSit = book value of equity per share of firm i at the end of year t, scaling with number of 
shares outstanding at the end of year t,
EPSit = earnings from continuing operations per share of firm i at the end of year t, scaling with 
number of shares outstanding at the end of year t.
NFDIit = non-financial disclosure index of firm i in the CNFS at the end of year t.
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, we change in Model 1 the NFDI with EDI and SDI as follows:
Pit = γ0 + γ1 D + γ2 BVPSit + γ3 D x BVPSit + γ4 EPSit + γ5 D x EPSit + γ6 EDIit 
        + γ7 EDIit x BVPSit + γ8 EDIit x EPSit + γ9 D x EDIit + εit (2a)
Pit = δ0 + δ1 D + δ2 BVPSit + δ3 D x BVPSit + δ4 EPSit + δ5 D x EPSit + δ6 SDIit
        + δ7 SDIit x BVPSit + δ8 SDIit x EPSit + δ9 D x SDIit + εit (2b)
where:
EDIit = environmental disclosure index of firm i in the CNFS at the end of year t,
SDIit = social disclosure index of firm i in the CNFS at the end of year t.
In Models 1, 2a, 2b, the interactions terms of the dummy variables Dt, Dnfr, the disclosure 
indexes NFDI, EDI, SDI with the accounting data allows to investigate the effect that each of 
these variables produce on the value relevance that investors assign to BVPS and EPS by 
increasing or decreasing their significance. We also include in the Models the interaction terms 
between Dt, Dnfr, and NFDI, EDI, SDI to document if there is a significant association between 
the effect related to each dummy variable and the measurement of disclosure.
We perform some robustness checks in order to test if results are robust to alternative 
specifications. We estimate Models 1, 2a, 2b using the stock prices of firms for 12 months, 
ending on 31 December of the year, along with the stock prices for 4, 5, 6 months after the end 
of year t. Further, we include in Models 1, 2a, 2b some control variables for firm size (natural 
logarithm of total assets and of revenue), leverage, profitability (return of assets and return of 
equity), as well as negative earnings. In all cases, the main conclusions of the study do not 
change with these additional specifications (Cardamone et al., 2012; de Klerk and de Villiers, 
2012; de Klerk et al., 2015; Reverte, 2016). To check for multicollinearity problems, variation 
inflation factors (VIF) are calculated for each model. The VIF values for all independent 
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variables are lower than 10.00, so multicollinearity is not a concern. Finally, the White test does 
not confirm the presence of heteroscedasticity.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
In Table 2 we report the NFDI, EDI and SDI in the pre- and post-Legislative Decree 
application (Panel A), and relative to the preparation or non-preparation of a non-financial 
report in these two periods (Panel B and Panel C).
In terms of non-financial disclosure, the NFDI shows an increase of non-financial disclosure 
from 20% to 40% on average, and a reduction of its dispersion from 29% to 17% (Table 2, 
Panel A). The main drivers of this increase are the information on the business model (NFDI_1), 
environmental information (NFDI_4), employee information (NFDI_5) and social information 
(NFDI_7). These changes are reflected in the EDI and SDI scores, which increase respectively 
on average from 5% to 9% and from 4% to 10%, with a reduction in their dispersion. These 
increases could be associated to the transition from a voluntary to a mandatory non-financial 
disclosure system, which implies both a legitimation and a standardization of such information 
in the post-Legislative Decree application. 
When we consider those firms providing a non-financial report (sustainability report or 
integrated report) in both the pre- and post-Legislati e Decree application, we can notice that 
there is a slight reduction in the transition to a mandatory non-financial disclosure system (Table 
2, Panel B). The NFDI decreases on average from 56% to 50%, EDI from 14% to 12%, and 
SDI from 12% to 11%, while their dispersion does not show any significant change. Despite 
the decreases, these levels of disclosure are higher when compared to those of firms preparing 
a CNFS only in the post-Legislative Decree application (Table 2, Panel C). The NFDI, EDI, 
SDI of the latter firms are 34%, 8%, 9% on average, which are much lower than those included 
in Panel B. 
The application of the two samples t-test and the Mann-Whitney test to the means and 
medians of NFDI, EDI, and SDI confirm the previous changes (Table 3). The findings are as 
follows: a) the differences on non-financial disclosures in the pre- and post-Legislative Decree 
application are significant at 1% (Table 3, Panel A); b) they are not significant when firms 
prepare a non-financial report in both pre- and post-Legislative Decree application (Table 3, 
Panel B); c) they are significant at 1% when we test firms preparing a non-financial report in 
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both pre- and post-Legislative Decree application versus those preparing CNFS in the post-
Legislative Decree application (Table 3, Panel C).
The descriptive statistics of P, BVPS and EPS under the different previous circumstances do 
not show any relevant change for these variables (Table 2, Panel A, Panel B and Panel C).
Overall, these results seem to show that firms disclosing a non-financial report in both the 
pre- and post-Legislative Decree application do not taken the opportunity to improve their non-
financial disclosure strategy to send a stronger signal to the market. Rather, they seem move 
toward a pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), by aligning their disclosure to the minimum 
information requirements included in the Decree. On the other hand, firms disclosing 
information only under a mandatory regime seem to adopt a conservative approach limiting 
their disclosure to a minimum amount. 
[Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here]
4.2. Regression results
Based on our hypotheses, we specify the Models 1, 2a, 2b in the pre- and post-Legislative 
Decree application (Table 4, Panel A) and with reference to the disclosure of non-financial 
information in these two periods (Table 4, Panel B). The adjusted R2 are higher than 60% in 
each model.
The results following the share price specification of Ohlson model (1995) show that BVPS 
and EPS are positively and significantly associated at 1% with share price in each model and 
under different circumstances (Table 4, Panel A and Panel B). These results are also confirmed 
when we consider the interaction terms of the dummy variables Dt, Dnfr with BVPS and EPS in 
each model, but with some exceptions. Indeed, the interaction terms Dt x EPS and Dnfr x BVPS 
have a significant and negative coefficient at 1%, showing a decrease of value relevance in EPS 
for companies in the pre-Legislative Decree application and in BVPS for firms not preparing 
voluntarily CNFS in the pre-Legislative Decree application. This means that the distinction 
between the two periods as well as between firms increases (decreases) the value relevance just 
in the post- Legislative Decree application where firms preparing a non-financial report in both 
pre- and post-Legislative Decree application benefits from their unchanged attitude towards 
this reporting. 
When we consider the NFDI, EDI and SDI, their coefficient are not significant in each model 
and under different circumstances (Table 4, Panel A and Panel B). This lack of significance is 
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also confirmed in each model when the provision of non-financial information (NFDI), 
environmental (EDI) and social (SDI) information is associated to the level of disclosure 
provided in the pre- and post-Legislative Decree application (Table 4, Panel A) and with 
reference to the disclosure of non-financial information in both the two periods (Table 4, Panel 
B). The interaction terms Dt x NFDI (EDI) (SDI) and Dnfr x NFDI (EDI) (SDI) are not 
significant, showing that the transition to a mandatory non-financial disclosure system does not 
produce any impact in terms of increase or decrease of value relevance. 
If the NFDI, EDI and SDI interact with BVPS and EPS, we notice a significant decrease or 
increase of value relevance measured by the interaction terms NFDI (EDI) (SDI) x BVPS (EPS) 
in the post-Legislative Decree application (Table 4, Panel A). On the contrary, we obtain an 
opposite and negative result for EPS when we consider the interaction terms NFDI (EDI) (SDI) 
x EPS relative to firms preparing a non-financial report in in both pre- and post-Legislative 
Decree application, as the coefficient is negative and significant (Table 4, Panel B). These 
findings mean that accounting numbers are the principals in driving the value relevance in each 
model, as the NFDI, EDI, SDI and Dt x NFDI (EDI) (SDI), Dnfr x NFDI (EDI) (SDI) are not 
significant. Even though firms are requir d to implement a non-financial disclosure system, the 
results show the prevalence of the financial disclosure system, as its effects on share prices are 
significant. 
Overall, the results provide evidence that high r levels – even though not so improving in 
their amounts – of non-financial, environmental and social information in the post-Legislative 
Decree application are not associated with share prices. The results provide evidence that non-
financial, environmental and social information beyond the financial accounting information 
do not provide incremental value-relevant information to investors. 
[Insert Table 4 about here]
5. Conclusions
The Legislative Decree 254/2016, implementing in Italy the EU Directive 95/2014, has made 
mandatory for large Italian companies to disclose non-financial information, so determining the 
transition from a system of non-financial disclosure, based on voluntary practices, to a 
mandatory regime.
On the basis of the relevant literature, the transition to a mandatory regime may increase the 
level of available information on the market. Indeed, the Legislative Decree fosters companies 
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without providing voluntary non-financial information to disclose such information to be 
compliant with the law. On the other hand, it encourages companies that voluntary disclosed 
information to maintain, or improve, their behavior after the Decree application. Moreover, the 
Decree is expected to increase comparability information over time, as it requires companies to 
be consistent in their disclosure and to provide comparable information across years. The paper 
investigates if the new requirements of providing non-financial disclosure influence share 
prices.
To assess the value relevance of non-financial information disclosed before and after the 
Legislative Decree application, we develop a specific disclosure framework to assess the 
amount of non-financial disclosure. In keeping previous evidence documenting that different 
types of information affect prices in different manners (Flammer, 2015; Verbeeten et al., 2016), 
we calculate three specific disclosure indices focusing on non-financial disclosure as a whole, 
environmental disclosure and social disclosure. Since in the new regulation the term non-
financial is synonym of ESG disclosure (European Commission, 2017), this allows us to make 
comparison with previous literature investigating if ESG information voluntarily disclosed by 
firms is value relevant.
Overall, we document a moderate increase of non-financial information after the Legislative 
Decree application, where matters on the environment, employee and society show the highest 
increase. Firms with a non-financial report (sustainability report or integrated report) even 
before the Decree do not make significant changes in their disclosure; while firms disclosing 
information only after the Decree show a lower level of information. This can be explained by 
the fact that the Decree only requires companies to disclose a minimum amount of information. 
Thus, firms that do not voluntarily disclose non-financial information limited their 
communication to the minimum necessary level to comply with the law. 
Applying the Ohlson model (1995), we then analyse the value relevance of non-financial 
information of Italian listed firms, before (2016) and after (2017) the application of the Decree. 
The results of our regression analysis show that accounting numbers are associated with share 
prices both before and after the transition, while non-financial information is not associated 
with share prices. This lack of significance is also confirmed when we test information 
concerning environmental and social disclosure. Overall, these results reject the hypothesis that 
the transition from a voluntary to a mandatory regulatory system produces effects on the market 
prices. These results contradict previous evidence documenting a positive effect of 
environmental regulation initiatives on market prices (Maloney and McCormick, 1982; Dowell 
et al., 2000). This difference could be explained by the fact that these studies examine regulation 
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approaches with a high degree of specification, while the Decree only requires a minimum 
amount of information and leave companies with a high level of discretion. 
Our results do not confirm previous evidence concerning the value relevance of non-
financial information in the European context. Studies on France, Finland, Sweden and UK 
with a mandated or recommended non-financial reporting system before the EU Directive, 
(Hassel, 2005; Cormier and Magnan, 2007; Schadewitz and Niskala, 2010; de Klerk et al., 
2015) find a significant association between the non-financial disclosure and share prices. 
Further, studies on Spain and Germany with a voluntary provision of non-financial information 
similar to Italy before the EU Directive support the value relevance of non-financial information 
(Reverte, 2016; Verbeeten et al., 2016). 
Our paper offers some relevant contributions to the extant literature. First, it is the first 
attempt to investigate the impact of the EU Directive on the value relevance of non-financial 
information. Therefore, our study complements the previous studies based on voluntary 
disclosure through the analysis of the association between mandatory disclosure and share 
prices. Second, it provides an analysis of the effect of mandatory disclosure in a setting where 
capital markets are second place to the banking system. The peculiarities of the setting 
investigated may suggest deepening if similar results are obtained in countries where the 
banking system and capital markets play roles similar or different to Italy. Third, the paper 
highlights what is the role of mandatory disclosur  systems in the new context of non-financial 
information, and if its non-value relevant effects maybe be confirmed in European countries 
different from Italy. 
Our study has two main limitations that open to future directions of research. First, it 
analyses the first application of the Legislative Decree, and this may suffer from the potential 
unreadiness of Italian capital markets to the novelty of the mandatory disclosure. Accordingly, 
our analysis may be repeated in the following years in order to test if the consequences of the 
non-financial mandatory disclosure setting on Italian financial markets will persist. Second, the 
paper does not investigate whether firms-determinants may undermine the non-financial 
information released to capital markets. To this extent, an analysis of the association between 
the dissemination of such information and some firms-characteristics may allow to test if such 
association affects the challenges associated with mandatory corporate responses to the 
Legislative Decree.
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Table 1 – The analytical framework
First-level categories (7) Second-level categories (46)
1. Business model (6) 1.1. Organizational profile (16)
1.2. Strategy (2)
1.3. Ethics and integrity (3)
1.4. Governance (22)
1.5. Stakeholder engagement (5)
1.6. Reporting practice (12)
2. Economic information (5) 2.1. Economic performance (7)
2.2. Market presence (5)
2.3. Indirect economic impacts (5)
2.4. Procurement practices (4)
2.5. Anti-competitive behaviour (4)
3. Anti-corruption and bribery matters information (1) 3.1. Anticorruption (6)





4.6. Effluents and waste (8)
4.7. Environmental compliance (4)
4.8. Supplier environmental assessment (5)
4.9. Product and services (5)
4.10. Transports (4)
4.11. Overall (4)
4.12. Environmental grievance mechanisms (4)
5. Employee information (6) 5.1. Employment (6)
5.2. Labour/management relations (4)
5.3. Occupational health and safety (7)
5.4. Training and education (6)
5.5. Diversity and equal opportunity (5)
5.6. Labour practices grievance mechanisms (4)
6. Protection of human rights information (8) 6.1. Non-discrimination (4)
6.2. Freedom of association and collective bargaining (4)
6.3. Child labour (4)
6.4. Forced or compulsory labour (4)
6.5. Security practices (4)
6.6. Rights of indigenous peoples (4)
6.7. Human rights assessment (6)
6.8. Human rights grievance mechanisms (4)
7. Social information (8) 7.1. Local communities (5)
7.2. Supplier social assessment (5)
7.3. Public policy (4)
7.4. Customer health and safety (5)
7.5. Marketing and labelling (6)
7.6. Customer privacy (4)
7.7. Socioeconomic compliance (4)
7.8. Grievance mechanisms for impacts on society (4)
Note: The table reports the first- and second-level categories of the analytical framework. We do not include the third level 
categories as they are too numerous. In brackets the number of categories in the relative level. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics in pre- and post-Legislative Decree application
Pre-Legislative Decree (Dt = 0) Post-Legislative Decree (Dt = 1)
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max
NFDI_1 114 6% 0% 8% 0% 22% 117 11% 13% 6% 0% 22%
NFDI_2 114 2% 0% 3% 0% 9% 117 3% 3% 3% 0% 9%
NFDI_3 114 1% 0% 1% 0% 2% 117 2% 2% 1% 0% 2%
NFDI_4 114 5% 0% 7% 0% 25% 117 9% 9% 5% 0% 22%
NFDI_5 114 3% 0% 4% 0% 12% 117 7% 7% 2% 0% 11%
NFDI_6 114 1% 0% 3% 0% 13% 117 3% 2% 3% 0% 11%
NFDI_7 114 2% 0% 4% 0% 14% 117 5% 5% 3% 0% 14%
NFDI 114 20% 0% 29% 0% 91% 117 40% 41% 17% 5% 90%
EDI 114 5% 0% 7% 0% 25% 117 9% 9% 5% 0% 22%
SDI 114 4% 0% 7% 0% 25% 117 10% 9% 4% 0% 22%
P 114 10.060 4.330 13.800 0.030 76.300 117 11.110 4.350 14.520 0.030 79.050
BVPS 114 4.601 2.544 5.691 -3.341 32.852 117 4.741 2.556 5.782 -3.511 32.824
EPS 114 0.394 0.246 0.672 -2.095 2.608 117 0.532 0.272 0.830 -1.181 5.886
Panel B: Descriptive statistics in pre- and post-Legislative Decree application and Dnfr = 1
Pre-Legislative Decree (Dt = 0) Post-Legislative Decree (Dt = 1)
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max
NFDI_1 40 16% 13% 4% 11% 22% 40 14% 13% 4% 3% 22%
NFDI_2 40 5% 6% 3% 2% 9% 40 5% 5% 3% 0% 9%
NFDI_3 40 2% 2% 1% 0% 2% 40 2% 2% 0% 0% 2%
NFDI_4 40 14% 13% 5% 1% 25% 40 12% 11% 5% 2% 22%
NFDI_5 40 8% 8% 2% 0% 12% 40 8% 8% 2% 4% 11%
NFDI_6 40 4% 2% 4% 0% 13% 40 4% 2% 4% 0% 11%
NFDI_7 40 7% 6% 3% 0% 14% 40 6% 6% 3% 2% 14%
NFDI 40 56% 55% 17% 23% 91% 40 50% 46% 16% 21% 90%
EDI 40 14% 13% 5% 1% 25% 40 12% 11% 5% 2% 22%
SDI 40 12% 11% 6% 3% 25% 40 11% 10% 5% 4% 22%
P 40 9.510 4.860 13.210 0.220 76.300 40 10.190 4.860 13.870 0.230 79.050
BVPS 40 4.179 2.585 4.053 0.105 19.673 40 4.436 2.593 4.359 0.079 20.343
EPS 40 0.465 0.298 0.523 -0.321 2.383 40 0.505 0.375 0.580 -0.253 2.186
Panel C: Descriptive statistics in pre- and post-Legislative Decree application and Dnfr = 0
Pre-Legislative Decree (Dt = 0) Post-Legislative Decree (Dt = 1)
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max
NFDI_1 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 9% 13% 6% 0% 22%
NFDI_2 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 3% 2% 2% 0% 9%
NFDI_3 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 1% 2% 1% 0% 2%
NFDI_4 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 8% 8% 4% 0% 20%
NFDI_5 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 6% 6% 2% 0% 11%
NFDI_6 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 3% 2% 2% 0% 10%
NFDI_7 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 4% 5% 3% 0% 13%
NFDI 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 34% 38% 16% 5% 78%
EDI 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 8% 8% 4% 0% 20%
SDI 74 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 77 9% 9% 4% 0% 20%
P 74 10.360 4.120 14.190 0.030 73.350 77 11.580 4.180 14.920 0.030 71.280
BVPS 74 4.829 2.387 6.419 -3.341 32.852 77 4.899 2.465 6.419 -3.511 32.824
EPS 74 0.355 0.171 0.741 -2.095 2.608 77 0.547 0.239 0.937 -1.181 5.886
Notes: Panels A, B, and C present the descriptive statistics of NFDIm = non-financial disclosure index for each first-level 
category m = 1, …, 7; NFDI = non-financial disclosure index in the CNFS; EDI = environmental disclosure index in the CNFS; 
SDI = social disclosure index in the CNFS; P = stock price, 3 months after the end of year t; BVPS = book value of equity per 
share at the end of year t, scaling with number of shares outstanding at the end of year t; EPS = earnings from continuing 
operations per share at the end of year t, scaling with number of shares outstanding at the end of year t. Dt = 1 if post-Legislative 
Decree application, 0 if pre-Legislative Decree application; Dnfr = 1 if firms prepare a non-financial report in both pre- and 
post-Legislative Decree application, 0 if not.
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Table 3 – Differences on non-financial disclosure
Panel A: Pre- vs. post-Legislative Decree application
Variable Mean (Dt = 0)N = 114
Mean (Dt = 1)
N = 117 t statistic
Median (Dt = 0)
N = 114
Median (Dt = 1)
N = 117 W statistic
NFDI 20% 40% -6.38*** 0% 41% 10,041.5***
EDI 5% 9% -5.51*** 0% 9% 10,081.5***
SDI 4% 10% -6.96*** 0% 9% 9,556.5***
Panel B: Pre- vs. post-Legislative Decree application and Dnfr = 1
Variable Mean (Dt = 0)N = 40
Mean (Dt = 1)
N = 40 t statistic
Median (Dt = 0)
N = 40
Median (Dt = 1)
N = 40 W statistic
NFDI 56% 50% 1.56 55% 46% 1,785.5
EDI 14% 12% 1.62 13% 11% 1,781.0
SDI 12% 11% 0.88 11% 10% 1,687.5
Panel C: Dnfr = 1 vs. Dnfr = 0 in post-Legislative Decree application
Variable Mean (Dnfr = 1)N = 40
Mean (Dnfr = 0)
N = 77 t statistic
Median (Dnfr = 1)
N = 40
Median (Dnfr = 0)
N = 77 W statistic
NFDI 50% 34% 5.27*** 46% 38% 3,133.5***
EDI 12% 8% 4.73*** 11% 8% 3,152.5***
SDI 11% 9% 2.94** 10% 9% 2,818.0**
Notes: Panels A, B, and C present the results of differences on non-financial disclosure by applying the two-sample t-test on 
means (t statistic) and the Mann–Whitney test on medians (W statistic). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. The variable definitions are the same as in Table 2.
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Table 4 – Regression results
Panel A: Value relevance in the pre- and post-Legislative Decree application
Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b
Dt 1.900 (0.720) 2.400 (0.990) 1.440 (0.580)
BVPS 0.931*** (0.189) 0.916*** (4.840) 0.925*** (4.880)
Dt x BVPS 1.346*** (4.090) 1.073*** (3.490) 1.427*** (4.270)
EPS 10.810*** (6.680) 10.830*** (6.740) 11.180*** (6.880)
Dt x EPS -11.190*** (-5.160) -9.950*** (-4.770) -11.380*** (-5.030)
NFDI 0.002 (0.170)
NFDI x BVPS -0.014*** (-5.400)
NFDI x EPS 0.1027*** (5.050)
Dt x NFDI -0.016 (-0.800)
EDI -0.007 (-0.140)
EDI x BVPS -0.057*** (-5.230)
EDI x EPS 0.449*** (5.100)
Dt x EDI -0.080 (-1.010)
SDI 0.036 (0.610)
SDI x BVPS -0.060*** (-5.370)
SDI x EPS 0.385*** (4.310)
Dt x SDI -0.068 (-0.830)
AdjR2 0.639 0.638 0.634
F-value 46.340*** 46.050*** 45.390***
N 230 230 230
Panel B: Value relevance if firms prepare a non-financial report in both pre- and post-Legislative Decree application
Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b
Dnfr -2.270 (-0.670) -1.860 (-0.630) -3.650 (-1.370)
BVPS 0.992*** (5.630) 1.015*** (5.860) 0.964*** (5.520)
Dnfr x BVPS -2.222*** (-5.100) -2.143*** (-4.710) -2.218*** (-5.230)
EPS 9.780*** (7.160) 9.100*** (6.960) 10.260*** (7.430)
Dnfr x EPS 25.400*** (7.050) 24.160*** (6.430) 24.730*** (7.420)
NFDI 0.003 (0.240)
NFDI x BVPS 0.0004 (0.160)
NFDI x EPS -0.053** (-2.270)
Dnfr x NFDI 0.006 (0.250)
EDI 0.023 (0.370)
EDI x BVPS 0.0008 (0.070)
EDI x EPS -0.186* (-1.690)
Dnfr x EDI 0.004 (0.050)
SDI 0.014 (0.250)
SDI x BVPS 0.003 (0.360)
SDI x EPS -0.244** (-2.660)
Dnfr x SDI 0.073 (0.870)
AdjR2 0.667 0.662 0.671
F-value 52.300*** 51.090*** 53.210***
N 230 230 230
Notes: Panels A and B present the effect produced by each variable on the value relevance of non-financial information. t 
statistics for the regression coefficients are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. The variable definitions are the same as in Table 2. We control each model for heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity. The White test does not confirm the presence of heteroscedasticity, and the calculation of variation inflation 
factors (VIF) is lower than 10.00 for each independent variable.
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